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Introduction 
 
The results of Malaysia’s twelfth general election in March 2008 have been described as 
a ‘political tsunami’.  The ruling Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) coalition, a 
multiethnic mix of constituent parties, suffered a major electoral swing against it with 
each of the primary peninsular opposition parties posting remarkable gains.1  The BN’s 
share of seats in the country’s parliament, the Dewan Rakyat, plunged to 63 per cent, its 
overall vote plummeted to 51 per cent, and four state governments fell to the 
opposition.2  While the end result was clearly startling, it is the process by which the 
political opposition achieved this outcome that bears further scrutiny.  In many respects, 
the results of 2008 can be seen as a consequence of the economic and political crises 
that erupted in Malaysia in the wake of the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC).  
As we shall see below in greater detail, the claim here is that by helping to undermine so 
many of the prevalent assumptions underpinning the legitimacy of the Malaysian 
government, in particular, its emphases on economic performance and political stability, 
the AFC altered the socio-political terrain in Malaysia.  This, in turn, forced the 
country’s political leaders to rethink the communally-based structures of political 
domination and/or hegemony that work to the advantage of Malaysia’s largest ethnic 
group, the Malays.   What the 2008 election now hinted at was the substantive 
emergence of the kind of issue-based, cross-communal politics that had been promised 
by the rise of the Reformasi (Reform) movement almost a decade before and the 
potential for a political structure founded more on an inclusive sense of national identity 
rather than on the kinds of personalistic or identity-based appeals made by ethnically 
and/or religiously configured political organizations.  What this suggested, in turn, was 
a distinct shift in the bases and processes of political legitimation in Malaysia, one that 
meant political leaders and their organizations would now have to attract support from a 
much wider cross-section of society if they were to be considered legitimate.  
 
                                                
1 As of October 2012 these are: the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO); the Malaysian 
Chinese Association (MCA); the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC); Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia; People’s 
Progressive Party (PPP); Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu; Sarawak United People’s Party; Parti Bersatu 
Sabah (PBS); Liberal Democratic Party; Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sabah; United Pasokmomongun 
Kadazandusus Murut Organization; Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party and; Parti Rakyat Sarawak.  
Historically, UMNO, MCA and MIC have held the bulk of the BN’s parliamentary seats. In addition, 
these three parties carry the legacy of the Alliance Party, which controlled the Malayan/Malaysian 
government from Independence in 1957 until 1969. The primary opposition parties on the peninsula are: 
Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People’s Justice Party, PKR), the Democratic Action Party (DAP), and Parti 
Islam SeMalaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS). 
2 The BN had already lost Kelantan, which had been under continuous PAS rule since the 1990 general 
election. 
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However, a disaggregated analysis of the election results renders this supposition 
unclear, for while the BN lost support generally this was not equally distributed across 
Malaysia’s main ethnic communities; there were drastic falls in Indian and Chinese 
support for the BN but only a marginal dip in Malay support.3  Such statistics seem to 
reflect the continuing communal nature of Malaysian politics.4  Thus, while the results 
of the 2008 general election seemed to point to a significant shift in the socio-political 
terrain of Malaysia, doubts persist over whether or not the traditionally communal, i.e., 
ethnic, nature of Malaysian politics had fundamentally changed.  Although the 
opposition parties officially joined forces soon after the 2008 election as the Pakatan 
Rakyat (People’s Alliance, PR) and have continually stressed minority economic, 
cultural and religious rights, such advances, although significant, do not necessarily 
signal an end to a communally-based system of politics.  While the opposition coalition 
advances a vision of a Malaysian national identity defined less by ethnicity and/or 
religion and more by a shared civic nationhood, the implementation of this vision 
remains an essentially communal one, in the sense of there being conscious attention 
paid to power-sharing among Malaysia’s primary ethnic groups.5  The Malaysian 
‘imagined community’ and any notion of a genuinely inclusive Malaysian national 
identity apparently remains an on-going and contested project. 
 
What then is the actual effect of external phenomena such as the AFC on domestic 
socio-political structures and notions of national identity within states such as 
Malaysia?6   The underlying puzzle this thesis seeks to address is just how domestic 
                                                
3 K.M. Ong (2008). “Making Sense of the Political Tsunami”, Malaysiakini, 11 March, 2008, 
www.malaysiakini.com, accessed 25 April, 2011. The Malaysian government’s 2010 Census lists the 
ethnic composition of Malaysia as: Bumiputera – 67.4%; Chinese – 24.6%; Indian – 7.3% and; Others – 
0.7%.  The issue here is that the designation ‘Bumiputera’ includes both Malays as well as other groups 
considered indigenous to the country.  As such it presents a group, which is, in reality, more 
heterogeneous than the term might suggest.   
4 This view is further supported by the fact that, since the previous general election in 2004, racial and 
religious tensions had been simmering, stirred by non-Malays’ sense of socioeconomic marginalization in 
a period of increasing globalization, the destruction of dozens of Indian temples, a series of challenges to 
non-Muslims’ legal rights, and incendiary pro-Malay and pro-Muslim rhetoric, particularly from UMNO 
leaders.   
5 I recognize that attempts to talk of who exactly are ‘the Malays’, ‘the Chinese’ or ‘the Indians’ as a 
people is to engage with a subject matter of bewildering diversity and contradiction.  In particular, notions 
of just who is ‘Malay’ and what it means to be ‘Malay’ remain open questions today, just as they have 
throughout the history of the region.  For an excellent overview of the historical development of the idea 
of ‘Malayness’ and ‘the Malays’, see: Anthony Milner (2008). The Malays. Wiley-Blackwell: Oxford.  
This issue is taken up in further detail below in Section 2.1. 
6 While some might question how an apparently regional crisis can be considered global in nature, I 
would argue not only that some of the preconditions for the crisis were global in nature – financial 
globalization and the liberalization of international capital markets, for example – but that the 
consequences of this nominally ‘Asian’ crisis had global ramifications not least in the post hoc calls for a 
new regime of international finance as well as the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) within 
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reverberations of ‘the global’ are mediated by the specific historical structure of a state, 
particularly within the postcolonial context. However, instead of viewing such historical 
incidents as either global forces or domestic social forces impacting upon the state and 
conceptions of national identity, this thesis will argue that what is actually occurring is 
the result of the interplay between these two broad fields of forces.  Global forces and 
domestic social forces alike impact upon the state and social boundaries within a 
country, helping to give shape to constructions of who is ‘us’ and who is ‘them’ – issues 
which, I suggest in this thesis, are intimately connected to concepts of legitimacy and 
legitimation.  Furthermore, in investigating these concepts I will argue that the 
relationship between the international and domestic domains vis-à-vis the state should 
be represented as a mutually constitutive dynamic – that a state’s interrelationship with 
‘the global’ is constructed and reconstructed by the shape of its state-society relations 
which themselves are forged and reforged by the state’s interrelationship with global 
forces.7  Such an approach views the state as the common but contested ground 
overlapped by both the domestic and international spheres.  Figure 1 below represents 
this process of mutual constitution. 
 
Figure 1: A Dynamic of Mutual Constitution 
 
 
 
 
 
                             
Society   State   Global Forces 
                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
any such reformulation.  See: Robert Wade (1998). “The Asian Debt-and-Development Crisis of 1997-?: 
Causes and Consequences.” World Development, 26(8), pp.1535-1553. 
7 See: Ian Clark (1999), Globalization and International Relations Theory. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  Sumit Mandal ponders this issue in his study of the use of English in Malaysia; Sumit K. Mandal 
(2000). “Reconsidering Cultural Globalization: The English Language in Malaysia.” Third World 
Quarterly, 21(6), p.1002.  See also: Abdul Rahman Embong (2001).  “The Culture and Practice of 
Pluralism in Postcolonial Malaysia” in, Robert W. Hefner (ed.), The Politics of Multiculturalism: 
Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press; 
pp.60-63; Norani Othman and Clive Kessler (2000). “Capturing Globalization: Prospects and Projects”, 
Third World Quarterly, 21(6), p.1017 and; Melani Budianta (2000). “Discourse of Cultural Identity in 
Indonesia During the 1997-1998 Monetary Crisis”, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 1(1), p.109. 
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Political Authority and Conceptualizations of National Identity 
 
The central research question this thesis seeks to answer is: How are conceptions of 
national identity in Malaysia being shaped by the interrelationship between domestic 
society, the state and the global?  Utilizing the concept of national identity as an 
organizing principle while eschewing either a top-down (global-state) or bottom-up 
(society-state) approach in favour of a model which positions the relationship between 
the international and domestic spheres and the state as a mutually constitutive dynamic 
offers a much more complete picture of the processes in operation.  Figure 1 represents 
such processes of mutual constitution not only with regard to the relationships between 
society and state on the one hand and state and the global on the other, but further seeks 
to illustrate how domestic society may impact on the mutual adjustment between state 
and global forces as well as how global forces may affect state-society relations.  The 
global and the local are fusing in such a way that it becomes hard to see where one starts 
and the other ends.8  What is more, both the global and the domestic become something 
other than they were: each interacts not just with the other, but rather with the evolving 
social context which they both share.9  In this way the global becomes clothed in local 
knowledge and the very tension this creates raises new questions and new solutions, 
offering a means by which to explore mechanisms of transformation and change. 
 
It is important to remember that national identity is almost always the result of political 
rather than natural processes and this is especially so in many postcolonial states where 
an overarching and coherent national identity is frequently lacking.  In countries where 
social affiliations at the sub-national (or even transnational) level may be chosen over 
state-based and promulgated rationale certain issues arise: How to create a national 
army when other loyalties are prioritized? Why pay taxes if the state is associated with a 
particular group?  How to apply the rule of law when a part of the population functions 
by or is subject to customary and/or religious law?10  In all states, political actors will 
                                                
8 For example, see: Saskia Sassen (2003b). “Globalization or Denationalization?”, Review of 
International Political Economy, 10(1), pp.1-22. 
9 For an example of such processes see Andrew Harding’s discussion on the transplantation of legal ideas 
between the colonizer and the colonized in Malaysia in, Andrew Harding (2002). “Global Doctrine and 
Local Knowledge: Law in South East Asia”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 51, pp.35-
53. 
10 Several authors have noted the need to more explicitly consider the nature of political legitimacy in 
postcolonial, developing countries.  For example, see: Muthiah Alagappa (ed.) (1995a), Political 
Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority.  Stanford: Stanford University Press; 
(especially, pp.1-8 & 11-65); Joel Migdal (1988). Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society 
Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Douglas Blum 
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seek to legitimize their own position and power by appealing to some overall identity of 
those whose support they are trying to obtain.  In postcolonial, multiethnic/multi-
religious states like Malaysia such processes of legitimation are especially problematic.  
While such states are buffeted by many of the same ‘external’ and ‘internal’ social, 
political and economic forces that generally affect the sources of legitimacy worldwide, 
postcolonial states differ in that they lack the apparent ‘organic’ foundation that most 
Western states now purport to possess.11  In many Western states, legitimacy is ideally a 
concept founded on the premises of the doctrine of popular sovereignty, that as the 
ultimate basis of authority ‘the people’ are the only legitimate source of power.12  
 
The problem in many postcolonial states is that who and what exactly are ‘the people’ 
remains inchoate.  As Daniela Obradovic comments, “legitimacy reflects the belief that 
one system is just because it embodies not just any shared understanding but an 
accepted superior justificatory principle, the myth.  Myth is the state of belief that 
supports an organic model of politics because it provides an assertion of intertemporal 
identity and reveals the authentic actions of the popular sovereign.”13  Postcolonial, 
multiethnic/multi-religious states have generally lacked a coherent, inclusive myth to 
supply a metaphysical basis for the state; one that provides the terms by which questions 
of political authority are settled. Without such a master narrative to underpin 
conceptions of political authority governance becomes increasingly difficult, as state 
actors must instead rely on coercion or appeals to self-interest in order to achieve and 
maintain social control over their citizenry. 
 
Eschewing the dichotomous structure that characterizes practically all past models of 
change at the structural or organizational level, Joel Migdal suggests modeling state-
                                                                                                                                          
(2007). National Identity and Globalization: Youth, State and Society in Post-Soviet Eurasia.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; (especially, pp.50-73); Bruce Gilley (2005). “Political Legitimacy in 
Malaysia: Regime Performance in the Asian Context”, in, Lynn White (ed.), Legitimacy: Ambiguities of 
Political Success or Failure in East and Southeast Asia. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing; pp.29-
67 and; Nicholas Tarling (2004). Nationalism in Southeast Asia. London: Routledge; pp.162-196. 
11 Admittedly, such observations equally apply to the history of Western societies.  For instance, many 
would argue that a French national identity really only developed from the 19th century.  However, the 
relative ‘newness’ of postcolonial societies makes such struggles more acute and I would argue that the 
position of the industrial countries is qualitatively different that that of postcolonial states. Many 
postcolonial states were defined by a generally arbitrary geographical demarcation, based on colonial 
possession, which consequently made the problem of creating a sense of national unity particularly 
challenging and the integrity of the state more tenuous, especially when one considers the multiethnic and 
multi-religious makeup of many such states.  
12 The universality of the idea today is acknowledged in the UN Declaration of Human Rights that ‘the 
will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government’ (Art. 21). 
13 Daniela Obradovic (1996). “Political Legitimacy and the European Union”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 34(2), p.195. 
6 
 
society relations as a mélange of social organizations.14  Looking at Third World 
societies as a whole, he notes that while we can detect the presence of some important 
commonly held norms and histories that could potentially “provide the bases for the 
symbolic configuration underpinning social control”, these shared experiences often 
pale in comparison to the “radically different sets of beliefs and recollections dispersed 
throughout the society.”15    Struggles for legitimacy in postcolonial societies thus 
involve state actors negotiating the push and pull of non-state social organizations in 
order to determine who has the right and ability to make rules in that society.16  Put 
another way, what power is legitimate and on what grounds?  The goal of any 
government in this regard is to render itself the primary source of authority within its 
borders.17 
 
While there has been a renewed focus on the part of many postcolonial governments to 
develop a more robust empirical basis for their legitimacy since the end of the Cold 
War, their situation in this respect has been further complicated by the need for many 
such governments to engage with the global economy for the purposes of 
development.18  As political elites have had to take into account not only global 
economic but, also, political and social pressures, their ability to articulate a ‘national’ 
ideology with reference primarily to their specific historical, i.e., ‘internal’, 
circumstances has become increasingly problematic.19 This raises a second key question 
of this thesis:  What are the bases of political authority in postcolonial, developing 
states such as Malaysia given the interrelationship between domestic social forces, the 
state and the global?  There is a clear need to explore how conceptions of national 
identity have been, and continue to be, shaped by both domestic and global forces.  
What exactly is the link between the ethnic and/or religious bases of a national identity, 
for example, and the influence of global forces in a state?  In turn, what impact might 
                                                
14 Migdal (1988), pp.28-29.  In the case of Malaysia, such macrolevel change would involve a distinct 
shift away from the explicitly ethnic character of social, political and economic relations that has come to 
typify the country. 
15 Migdal (1988), p.36 & p.37. 
16 Admittedly, such observations equally apply to Western societies.  However, the relative ‘newness’ of 
postcolonial societies makes such struggles more acute. 
17 Obradovic, p.194. 
18 Michael Barnett (1995). "The New United Nations Politics of Peace: From Juridical Sovereignty to 
Empirical Sovereignty" Global Governance, 1(1), p.89. 
19 For example, see:  Francis L.K. Wah and Joakim Ojendal (eds.) (2005). Southeast Asian Responses to 
Globalization: Restructuring Governance and Deepening Democracy. Singapore: ISEAS.  What this 
edited volume indicates is that there is no single or simple pattern in the responses of Southeast Asian 
states to globalization in both its economic and cultural forms.  See also: H. Salleh (2000). “Globalization 
and the Challenge to Malay Nationalism as the Essence of Malaysian Nationalism”, in, Leo Suryadinata 
(ed.), Nationalism and Globalization: East and West. Singapore: ISEAS; pp.132-174.   
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global forces have on the ways in which national identity is conceptualized in 
multiethnic states?  ‘National’ identity is a valuable resource in this endeavour and 
understanding how such identities have been (re)constructed and contested is a central 
aim of this thesis. 
 
Central Argument of the Study 
 
This thesis tells a story about how political elites in Malaysia have sought to construct 
and use ideas about ‘national’ identity in order to, first, sediment their power and, 
second, to legitimize that power as authority.  In doing so, these elites have tried to 
define the contours of the Malaysian state, as it looks both inwards and outwards, in a 
way that serves their own political purposes.  In the case of Malaysia, assumptions 
about ‘the nation’ were based on claims about the logic and primacy of certain identity 
preferences, in particular that of ‘the Malay’, which were then given political force 
through policies on national development including, for example, education, culture and 
the economy.  While the assumptions underpinning conceptualizations of ‘national’ 
identity have always been a site of contestation in Malaysia and also have never been an 
entirely internal process, political elites in Malaysia found it easier to manipulate that 
identity in the periods immediately following independence in 1957.  The reason for 
this, I argue, is because the centrality of ethnicity in both Malaysian political culture and 
narratives of ‘national’ identity at the time were shared by elites and a social majority.  
At the same time, there was less need for state actors to take account of the ‘global’, 
simply because it did not function then in the same ways as which it has come to do.20  
In short, political elites could largely disregard the global and set their sights squarely 
on the internal/domestic scene when it came to legitimating their political power. 
 
This situation, however, could not last and the broad hypothesis behind this research 
project is that state actors have found it increasingly difficult to avoid external socio-
political and economic pressures, which has then made the maintenance of power and 
authority more problematic.  This, in turn, has lead to greater political fracturing as state 
actors have either chosen, or have been compelled, to engage with ‘the global’, not just 
in terms of economic demands but also with respect to calls for socio-political 
transformation and democratization.  As such processes have evolved, it has become 
                                                
20 Ira Cohen (1987). “Structuration Theory and Social Praxis.” in, Anthony Giddens and Jonathan Turner 
(eds.), Social Theory Today. Stanford: Stanford University Press; p. 285.   
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more and more difficult for political elites to maintain and legitimate their power given 
that their position as the intervening variable between the internal and the external has 
become increasingly undermined by the actions of ordinary Malaysians who have begun 
to engage directly with ‘the global’, both positively and negatively. The situation for 
political elites has been further complicated by the ways in which particular ideas of 
Malay primacy have been embedded politically, economically and socially and how 
these notions have become potentially counterproductive given the demands for 
development and the need for investment.  That is, global forces act upon and 
destabilize political culture and assumptions about what is ‘eternal’ and ‘taken-for-
granted’ in Malaysian politics and society, disrupting elite efforts to maintain social 
control and authority (for their own benefit).21 
 
Malaysia now faces a ‘rock and a hard place’ situation.22  On the one hand, Malaysian 
state actors, in the absence of more ‘organic’ bases for political legitimation, have come 
to rely more and more on the legitimacy offered by economic performance.  However, 
for the Malaysian economy to remain viable in the global market place, socio-political 
transformation is now required.  In this way, the very elements which political elites 
have made the bedrock of their policies – ideas about ‘national identity’ and the 
privileging of the Malay community – now threaten, or at the very least complicate 
immensely, their efforts to be globally viable.  In this way, the underlying research 
puzzle of this thesis is illuminated; it is not just global processes which may affect the 
(re)formulation of a ‘national’ ideology but that the historical context of state-society 
relations within which such an articulation can occur might also constitute a particular 
framework for interaction between the state and global processes.23  All of these points 
highlight the need to conduct a historical examination of the Malaysian case so as to 
recognize the historical origins of powerful discourses, which claim to be universal and 
                                                
21 See: A.B. Shamsul (2002). “Globalization and Democratic Developments in Southeast Asia: 
Articulation and Social Response.” in, Catarine Kinnvall and Kristina Jonsson (eds.), Globalization and 
Democratization in Asia – The Construction of Identity. London: Routledge; pp.193-209; Othman and 
Kessler; Muthiah Alagappa (1995b). “Introduction” in, Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Political Legitimacy in 
Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority.  Stanford: Stanford University Press; pp.6-7 and; Joakim 
Ojendal (2005). “Democratization Amidst Globalization in Southeast Asia: Empirical Findings and 
Theoretical Reflections.” in, Francis L.K. Wah and Joakim Ojendal (eds.) (2005). Southeast Asian 
Responses to Globalization: Restructuring Governance and Deepening Democracy. Singapore: ISEAS; 
pp.345-372. 
22 See: Michael O’Shannassy (2011). “Malaysia in 2010: Between a Rock and a Hard Place”, Asian 
Survey, 51(1), pp.173-185. 
23 In other words, states operate within a complex field of forces, which operate in both a ‘top-down’ 
(global processes) and ‘bottom-up’ (society/societies) manner.  This will be taken up in greater detail 
below. 
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eternal, as such examples are indicative of a greater complexity vis-à-vis the 
interrelationship between domestic social forces, the state and global processes than 
most accounts would suggest.24  
 
This thesis thus problematizes the nature of national identity and, critically, brings both 
the state and the global as well as the state and domestic society into a relationship of 
mutual adjustment.25    However, it will be necessary to acknowledge how such 
processes of mutual constitution may be asymmetrical, with either the internal or the 
external predominant at any particular point in time.  I argue that it is via a detailed 
consideration of national identity (re)construction that such asymmetry and an important 
under-examined aspect of these processes associated with this mutual constitution may 
be traced, thereby underlining the possibility of transformation and change.  
 
Aims and Focuses of the Study 
 
This thesis seeks to do three things.  First, it aims to explore the under-investigated 
interrelationship between domestic social forces, the state and global processes.  This 
mutually constitutive, dynamic arrangement is under-analyzed not only in general terms 
but, more specifically, with respect to postcolonial, multiethnic/multi-religious states 
such as Malaysia.  Second, in exploring this interrelationship, this thesis traces how 
social boundaries have historically come in to existence.  Following on from this, it also 
analyses how social boundaries are both maintained as well as subject to change in 
Malaysia.  Thus, the third aim of this thesis is to explore historically the influence of the 
interrelationship between domestic society, the state and the global on the foundations 
of political authority in Malaysia and the possibilities of transformation. 
 
The focus of the study is the interrelationship between global processes, the state and 
domestic social forces and how this dynamic is reflected not only in discourses on 
national identity but also in how such discourses are employed by state actors.  Clearly, 
such complex issues do not exist in a historical vacuum and I hold that historical 
                                                
24 Michel Foucault, following Nietzsche, argues that dominant discourses are the result of power struggles 
in which they have triumphed over other discourses and forms of knowledge.  Nietzsche once suggested 
that where there is meaning, it is possible to trace the struggles, battles and violence that produced it.  
See: Geoff Danaher, Tony Schirato and Jen Webb (2000). Understanding Foucault. London: Sage; p.47. 
25 In a similar vein, Othman and Kessler refer to Giddens’ ‘recursive’ dynamic whereby, “mundane ideas 
and even powerful doctrines about social reality, through their acceptance into human consciousness and 
the actions it informs, are fed back into and thus become a constitutive part of evolving sociocultural 
practice”.  Othman and Kessler, p.1021 (Emphasis in the original). 
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debates and/or struggles over (re)conceptions of the ‘imagined community’ best 
illuminate the dynamic outline above in Figure 1.  While nation state identities do tend 
to be sticky there is always some leeway for the purposive attempt of political actors to 
alter existing ideational frameworks and boundary definitions.26 However, such actors 
cannot construct new identities at will; the choices available to be made at such 
moments are constrained by past decisions on institutional forms and national models.27  
That is, new ideas about political order need to resonate with existing identity 
constructions embedded in political cultures and national institutions.  As Marcussen, et 
al, observe: 
 
While existing identity constructions are broadly defined and can resonate with a 
whole series of new ideas, they nevertheless define the range of options 
considered legitimate for new nation state identities.  There is no reason to 
believe that these existing identity constructions are ‘givens’, which are elevated 
above identity politics and contestation...Rather, new ideas about social order 
and the nation state need to resonate with previously embedded and 
institutionalized values, symbols and myths.28 
 
It should be emphasized that I view any ‘national identity’ project as on-going and 
subject to contestation.  A discourse is never a self-contained whole; there are open 
parts where it runs into other discourses in a discursive field in which meaning in which 
the battle over meaning takes place.  To put it simply, there are many different ways in 
which actors may employ a discourse and these are rarely static.  By analyzing the ways 
in which national identity discourses have been drawn upon historically and 
(re)conceptualized by political leaders in Malaysia, I aim to arrive at a more nuanced 
and richer understanding of the dynamic outlined in Figure 1.29  In particular, I 
emphasize the asymmetrical nature of this process of mutual constitution.  To reiterate 
the story being told in this thesis, there are moments where  ‘external’ pressures 
operating on the state predominate, whereas on other occasions the situation may be 
reversed with domestic social forces in the ascendancy.  Herein lies a need to 
understand such a dynamic; such an analysis underlines the possibilities for 
transformation and change in multiethnic and/or multi-religious countries. 
                                                
26 Martin Marcussen, Thomas Risse, Daniela Engelmann-Martin, Hans Joachim Knopf and Klaus 
Roscher (1999).  “Constructing Europe?  The Evolution of French, British and German Nation State 
Identities”, Journal of European Public Policy, 6(4), p.616. 
27 Jacques Bertrand (2004).  Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia. Cambridge: University of 
Cambridge Press; p.24. 
28 Marcussen, et al, p.617. 
29 To be fair, the ‘stage’ for the empirical chapters in this thesis does not cover the broad sweep of politics 
but, instead, is largely focused on specific processes surrounding general elections, aspects of 
development and other key policy areas. 
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The concept of ‘nations-of-intent’ as conceptualized by A.B. Shamsul is analytically 
valuable in this regard.30  While similar to Anderson’s conception of the ‘imagined 
community’, it differs in being a more open-ended concept.31  Discrete ‘nations-of-
intent’ not only reflect the broader cultural context within which they operate but they 
also reveal the range of possible interpretations to which any foundational myth may be 
subject.  A ‘nations-of-intent’ framework illustrates the dynamic processes involved in 
the (re)imagining of community.  One of the main aims of this thesis is to shed further 
light on the nature of historical struggles, and accommodations, between state actors, 
domestic social influences and global forces by employing such a ‘nations-of-intent’ 
approach.  I contend that the identification of separate and distinct ‘nations-of-intent’, as 
manifested in discourses surrounding notions of national identity, represents a 
productive and nuanced means of ascertaining and understanding what, within a specific 
state’s cultural context, is both (im)possible and (im)plausible as far as socio-political 
transformation is concerned.32  The ‘nations-of-intent’ concept helps to view the general 
discourse on nationalism and nationhood in a more positive light and allows us to 
examine more closely the mobilization of popular sentiments – “how identity forms are 
spread and transformed into fully fledged imagined communities, how legends and 
myths are rephrased, and how they are used to generate passion.”33  As noted earlier, the 
third aim of this thesis is to show how such processes operate in a historical sense in 
order highlight the possibility and shape of future transformation and change in 
Malaysia.   
 
By focusing primarily on the actions and behaviour of political elites this thesis does not 
mean to deny that potentially powerful everyday-defined ‘nations-of-intent’ may exist 
alongside or beneath authority-defined ‘nations-of-intent’.  However, while the former 
                                                
30 A.B. Shamsul (1996a). “Nations-of-Intent in Malaysia”., in, Stein Tønnesson and Hans Antlöv (eds.), 
Asian Forms of the Nation.  Richmond: Curzon Press; pp.323-347.  The term was actually first used by 
Robert Rotberg in an African context.  See, Robert Rotberg (1967). “African Nationalism: Concept or 
Confusion?” Journal of Modern African Studies, 4(1), pp.33-46. 
31 Benedict Anderson (1999).  Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso.   
32 This conceptual framework is probabilistic, not deterministic. As such, it aims to help reveal the 
tendency for socio-political transformation as well as the possible/probable shape of any such change 
based on a particular state’s cultural and historical context rather than predicting with any great degree of 
certainty what path a country shall take.  See: Stanley Lieberson and Freda B. Lynn (2002). “Barking up 
the Wrong Branch: Scientific Alternatives to the Current Model of Sociological Science”, Annual Review 
of Sociology, 28, pp.1-19.  
33 Stein Tønnesson and Hans Antlöv (1996). “Asia in Theories of Nationalism and National Identity”, in, 
Stein Tønnesson and Hans Antlöv (eds.), Asian Forms of the Nation.  Richmond: Curzon Press; p.38. 
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may exert considerable influence in shaping the discursive terms and practices of 
national identity in Malaysia, particularly in more recent times, I contend that, 
historically, state actors have played an overwhelmingly significant role in such 
processes simply because the lack of a coherent myth to underpin notions of political 
authority in Malaysia has meant that political elites have had to assume a central and 
active role in the creation of a sense of national identity. 
 
Research Methodology 
 
Charting and assessing the interrelationship between global processes, the state and 
domestic social forces is by nature a complex issue and one that lends itself to a 
distinctly qualitative analysis.34  In this sense, I argue that an interpretivist approach, 
which emphasizes the crucial role of contingency or ‘path dependence’ in politics, is 
required.35  Such an approach demonstrates how the idea of deterministic causation runs 
counter to the fundamental insight that social processes are stochastic in nature and thus 
require probabilistic thinking and a greater emphasis on meanings.36 One important 
reason why qualitative methods have been and remain important in International 
Relations (IR) research is that they possess “considerable advantages in studying 
complex phenomena...[which] often involved interaction effects among many structural 
                                                
34 Qualitative and quantitative approaches involve collecting data in different ways and the crucial 
question for any research project is whether the choice of method is appropriate for the theoretical and 
empirical questions that the project seeks to address. 
35 Claims that define interpretivism include: (a) Human behavior is to be understood (made sense of) 
rather than explained (attributed to causes). (b) Social scientists, unlike natural scientists, study a realm 
already constituted by meanings. (c) Social action is to be analyzed not as the effect of causes but as the 
conformity of behavior to rules. (d) The social world is constituted by intersubjective meanings, not brute 
facts. (e) The vocabulary of causal analysis is inconsistent with the vocabulary needed for a proper 
interpretive understanding of social life. (f) Prediction is not a sensible or reasonable goal of social 
inquiry. (g) In the study of society, theory is used not to predict but to uncover or clarify the import of 
symbolic acts.  See: David Dessler (2003). “The Positivist-Interpretivist Controversy.” Qualitative 
Methods: Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section on Qualitative 
Methods, 1(2), p.22. 
36 Robert Keohane (2003). “Disciplinary Schizophrenia: Implications for Graduate Education in Political 
Science.” Qualitative Methods: Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized 
Section on Qualitative Methods, 1(1), p.10 and Gerardo L. Munck (2003). “Teaching Qualitative 
Methodology: Rationale, State of the Art, and an Agenda.” Qualitative Methods: Newsletter of the 
American Political Science Association Organized Section on Qualitative Methods, 1(1), p.13.  To be fair, 
I recognize that, in reality, no instance of social research can make sense without relying on both cause 
and meaning.  36 Weber’s well-known definition of sociology suggests just such a dependence: 
“Sociology...is a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to 
arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects.” See: Max Weber (1947).  The Theory of Social 
and Economic Organization. Trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons. Glencoe: The Free Press; p.88. 
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and agent-based variables, path dependencies, and strategic interaction among large 
numbers of actors across multiple levels of analysis.”37  
Due to both methodological and practical problems, quantitative analyses often break 
theories into sets of bivariate or multivariate hypotheses that do not capture the dynamic 
aspects of the puzzles being investigated or stories being told.38  Qualitative methods 
are, thus, most appropriately employed when the goal of research is to explore 
intersubjective phenomena and capture the meanings, processes and context attached to 
them.39  In terms of this thesis, charting and assessing the interrelationship between 
global processes, the state and domestic social forces is by nature a complex issue and 
one that naturally lends itself to a distinctly interpretivist and qualitative approach. It 
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to discern discrete cause and effect 
relationships between domestic social forces and the state as well as between the state 
and the global, let alone between domestic social influences and global forces.  There 
are simply too many factors at play, each with varying degrees of historically 
conditioned influence.40 Given the difficulties involved in measuring such relationships, 
I suggest that employing a broad organizing principle, such as (re)conceptions of 
national identity, is a more fruitful path to take.  Not only do (re)conceptions of national 
identity cast a wide net and capture many of the processes in operation within the 
interrelationship sketched in Figure 1 but, furthermore, lends itself well to a historical 
analysis. 
                                                
37 Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman (2007). “Case Study Methods in the International Relations 
Subfield”, Comparative Political Studies, 40, p.171. 
38 Zeev Maoz (2002). “Case Study Methodology in International Studies: From Storytelling to Hypothesis 
Testing”, in Frank P. Harvey and Michael Brecher (eds.) Evaluating Methods In International Studies, 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, p.163.  I recognize that there are not some excellent examples 
of quantitative analyses, which attempt to investigate many of the same processes that lie at the core of 
my thesis; in particular, legitimacy/legitimation.  For example, Bruce Gilley considers the bivariate 
correlations to legitimacy of a range of socio-economic and political variables in order to arrive at a 
parsimonious and robust causal hypothesis, which reveals that universal factors appear able to explain 
roughly two-thirds of the variation in legitimacy levels across states.   Nevertheless, even in this case, 
with the remaining one-third attributable to local or contextual causes, Gilley is force to admit that most 
causal factors will almost always have both universal and contextual interpretations.  See: Bruce Gilley 
(2006). “The Determinant of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries.” International Political Science 
Review, 27(1), pp.47-71. 
39 Fiona Devine (2002). “Qualitative Methods”, in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds.), Theory and 
Methods in Political Science, Hampshire: Palgrave; p.199.  Ian Clark and Christian Reus-Smit note that 
when it comes to analyses of legitimacy/legitimation quantitative tools, while potentially helpful, remain 
just that, tools, in what is “ultimately an exercise in interpretation [as the] foundation of legitimacy is 
social recognition...[and it is difficult] to establish a priori quantitative measures of how much 
recognition is required to establish an actor’s or institution’s legitimacy.”  Ian Clark and Christian Reus-
Smit (2007). “Preface”, International Politics, 44, p.155. 
40 Given the complexity and relatively unstructured nature of many of the phenomena that lie at the heart 
of international relations, many puzzles in International Relations are difficult to model formally and to 
test statistically.  Indeed, I am not entirely certain what a quantitative methodology could look like with 
respect to my research project.  See: Bennett and Elman, p.171. 
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A Multi-Level Research Approach 
 
(Re)conceptions of national identity over time form the central investigation of this 
study.  While scholars have separately noted the influence of global processes and state-
society relations on such (re)conceptions, very few have explored the overall 
interrelationship between these ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ field of forces.  Chapter one 
of this thesis will survey this literature before outlining my theoretical agenda.  What 
should be apparent at this early stage is that my argument recognizes the micro-macro 
linkages in operation in any (re)conception of national identity.  A realistic analysis of 
the mutually constitutive dynamic outlined in Figure 1, therefore, needs to take into 
account how both the global and the local enable and constrain state actors.  A multi-
level approach is essential.  
 
In this thesis, in-depth empirical investigations are carried out into both the construction 
and practice of national identity discourses.  In order to explore the interrelationship 
between the state, global processes and domestic social forces I will employ a historical 
analysis of (re)conceptions of national identity in Malaysia, an ethnically and religiously 
heterogeneous postcolonial state.  The primary discourse that will inform my research 
project involves notions of ‘the national self’ as well as the interrogation of the 
boundary between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ within any (re)conception of national identity.  
That is, the discourse(s) surrounding the (re)defining of the boundaries of the imagined 
communities called Malaysia.  Or, to be more precise, the discourse(s) surrounding 
competing ‘nations-of-intent’ within Malaysia.  
 
Discourses are systems of signification which construct social realities. In this sense, 
discourses operate as structures, “for persons to differentiate and identify things, giving 
them taken-for-granted qualities and attributed, and relating them to other objects.”41 In 
my historical case study of Malaysia, discursive representations of national identity, or 
‘nations-of-intent’, have rendered complex relationships between the local, the national 
and the global understandable. However, the choice and practices of discursive 
representation are far from innocent and must be read in the historical context of a 
national political economy of power relations.  While distinct discursive contexts make 
                                                
41 Jennifer Milliken (1999). “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research 
Methods”, European Journal of International Relations, 5, p.231.  
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certain interpretations imaginable and particular policy responses plausible, they remain 
subject to contestation.  As Jennifer Milliken observes, “[d]iscourses make intelligible 
some ways of being in, and acting towards, the world and of operationalizing a 
particular ‘regime of truth’…”42  More specifically, they are understood to work to 
define and to enable, but also to silence and to exclude.  Therefore, while there is a clear 
theoretical commitment towards the study of the dominant discourse(s) there is also a 
concomitant commitment to all discourses being malleable and subject to contestation.  
Particular regimes of truth require re-articulation making discourses, “changeable and in 
fact historically contingent.”43 
 
While there might be rival discourses surrounding conceptualizations of ‘national 
identity’ within a country this does not mean, however, that they must be antagonistic in 
every respect. Michel Foucault observes that a change in discourse is not necessarily a 
complete change of discourse; rival discourses might just differ from each other on one 
single point, while they agree in other respects (at deeper levels).44 A fundamental 
disagreement might also, in principle, be an expression of the geographical, 
geopolitical, demographic or historical factors that inform a particular ‘national’ 
discourse. Finally, by recognizing that the idea of ‘the power structure’ of a social unit 
is a dangerously misleading notion, a ‘nations-of-intent’ approach embraces an image of 
‘patterned chaos’ rather than of smooth and predictable evolutionary change.45  In doing 
so, the evolving field of ‘nations-of-intent’ reveals that “the concept of power plays an 
important role in…political discourse in that it indicates realms where political action 
could have been different; or indeed where against apparent odds, it would have been 
possible in the first place.  It defines the realm of political action and its justification.”46  
We must, therefore, pay careful attention to “ the political responsibilities that come 
with ‘the specification of discourses’, [by] asking questions like ‘who speaks? who 
writes? when and where? with or to whom? under what institutional and historical 
constraints?’.”47 
                                                
42 Milliken (1999), p.229. 
43 Milliken (1999), p.230. Thus, ‘nations-of-intent’. 
44 Michel Foucault (1989). The Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Routledge; pp.146-147. 
45 John Hobson (1998). “The Historical Sociology of the State and the State of Historical Sociology in 
International Relations”, Review of International Political Economy, 5(2), p.291. 
46 Stefano Guzzini (2005). “The Concept of Power: A Constructivist Analysis”, Millennium, 33(3), p.508. 
47 Wanda Vrasti (2008). “The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations”, Millennium, 
37(2), p.294. 
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In this sense the ‘nations-of-intent’ model represents a dialogic rather than a dialectic 
interpretation of any (re)conceptualizing of national identity.48  In a dialogical process, 
various approaches coexist and are comparatively existential and relativistic in their 
interaction.  Here, each ideology can hold more salience in particular circumstances.  
Thus, particular interpretations of national identity (i.e. ‘nations-of-intent’) do not 
necessarily merge (or become subjugated) into other interpretations as in the dialectic 
process, but nonetheless modify themselves (sometimes fundamentally) over the course 
of mutual interaction. Adopting such an approach distinguishes my study from previous 
ones by subjecting possible changes in the construction and use of any national identity 
discourse in Malaysia to a more nuanced analysis.49  Tracing the historical discourses 
and sub-discourses surrounding (re)conceptions of national identity will allow me to 
arrive at a richer understanding of the interrelationship between domestic social forces, 
the state and the global. 
 
Case Study Selection Criteria 
 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the body of literature which stresses the need to 
acknowledge that conceptions of legitimacy, the practices of legitimation and the effects 
of globalization all have a particular shape in the Southeast Asian context, one that is 
not particularly observed in much of the general literature, even when presented in the 
                                                
48 See, for example: Benedict Kerkvliet (2001).  “An Approach for Analyzing State-Society Relations in 
Vietnam.” Sojourn, 16(2), pp.238-278. 
49 For examples of some previous studies, see:  Vijay Balasubramaniam (2007). “A Divided Nation: 
Malay Political Dominance, Bumiputera Material Advancement and National Identity in Malaysia”, 
National Identities, 9(1), pp.35-48; William Case (1995). “Malaysia: Aspects and Audiences of 
Legitimacy”, in, Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral 
Authority. Stanford: Stanford University Press; pp.69-107; William Case (2004). “Testing Malaysia’s 
Pseudo-democracy.” In, Edmund Gomez (ed.), The State of Malaysia: Ethnicity, Equity and Reform. 
London: Routledge Curzon; pp.29-48; Boon Kheng Cheah (2005). “Ethnicity in the Making of 
Malaysia.” in, Gungwu Wang (ed.), Nation-Building: Five Southeast Asian Histories. Singapore: ISEAS; 
pp.91-114; Sumit Ganguly (1997). “Ethnic Politics and Political Quiescence in Malaysia and Singapore”, 
in, Michael Brown and Sumit Ganguly (eds.), Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the 
Pacific. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; pp.233-272; Gilley (2005), pp.29-67; Edmund Gomez (2004). 
“Introduction: Politics, Business and Ethnicity in Malaysia: A State in Transition?” in, Edmund Gomez 
(ed.), The State of Malaysia: Ethnicity, Equity and Reform. London: RoutledgeCurzon; pp.1-28; Tim 
Harper (1996). “New Malays, New Malaysians: Nationalism, Society and History”, Southeast Asian 
Affairs, 23, pp.238-255; L.K. Hing (2004). “Different Perspectives on Integration and Nation-Building in 
Malaysia”, in, Leo Suryadinata (ed.), Ethnic Relations and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia: The Case 
of the Ethnic Chinese. Singapore: ISEAS; pp.82-108; Zawawi Ibrahim (2004). “Globalization and 
National Identity: Managing Ethnicity and Governance in Malaysia”, in, Y. Sato (ed.), Growth and 
Governance in Asia. Honolulu: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies; pp.115-136 and; H. Salleh 
(2000), pp.132-174. 
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context of the developing world.50  Even within Southeast Asia it is apparent that there 
are many different kinds of stories to be told.  For example, despite their coming 
together in a regional organization like ASEAN, each of the original five members – 
Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia – have had very different 
internal experiences.    While this is an unsurprising statement, the degree to which the 
respective historical narratives of each can be contrasted with the others remains 
astonishing.51 With this in mind, it would be a mistake to treat each country in the 
region as if it was merely a different example of a similar, largely Eurocentric, model. 
Instead, the differences in what each state inherited from the colonial regime at the point 
of independence means that we need to adopt distinct and separate approaches to each 
story so as to follow the dynamics of change that each country encountered.52  While the 
modern nation-state may be a political institution universalized via colonization in the 
Southeast Asian region, its formation and evolution were never shaped by a wholesale 
adoption of the Western model.  Rather, it was premised upon improvisations in 
response to cultural, contextual, and material particularities of different societies.53  
 
To the extent that the normative content, strategies and mechanisms of nation-state 
building are specific to particular historical struggles, we can argue that there can be no 
deterministic predictions of nation-state models.  At its core, then, this thesis is a study 
of Malaysia for which I use a ‘nations-of-intent’ framework in order to investigate and 
illuminate the nature of the global-local-state interrelationship in a postcolonial setting.  
It is important to once more highlight the research objective; there are several kinds of 
research objectives, including not only the development of generalized theories but also 
the historical explanation of particular cases. That is, the explanation of a sequence of 
events that produce a particular historical outcome in which key steps in the sequence 
are in turn explained with reference to theories or causal mechanisms.54 The 
contingency inherent in my central research puzzle – just how domestic reverberations 
of the global are mediated by the specific historical structurations of a particular state – 
means that a single case-study is a wholly appropriate analytical approach.  Certainly, 
                                                
51 See:  Wang Gungwu (2002). “Introduction” In, Cheah Boon Kheng, Malaysia: The Making of a 
Nation. Singapore: ISEAS; p.xiii. 
51 See:  Wang Gungwu (2002). “Introduction” In, Cheah Boon Kheng, Malaysia: The Making of a 
Nation. Singapore: ISEAS; p.xiii. 
52 Wang, p.xiii. 
53 Goh Beng Lan (2008). “Globalization and Postcolonial Nation in Malaysia: Theoretical Challenger and 
Historical Possibilities”, Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies, 23(2), p.5. 
54 Andrew Bennett (2002).  “Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantages.” In, Detlef 
F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky (eds.), Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International 
Relations.  Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press; p.21. 
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this involves sacrificing parsimony and generalizability.  Nevertheless, comparisons of 
hypothesized relationships at different points in time within the same case are 
particularly powerful as a means of making thick description possible; by addressing 
complex causal relationships case studies have the ability to accommodate complex 
causal relations.55  In short, a single-site case study generates “a multitude of 
qualitative-interpretive, within-case ‘observations’ reflecting patters of interaction, 
organizational practices, social relations, routines, actions” thereby contributing not 
only to our knowledge of general causation but also as part of an explanatory 
understanding of concrete historical events and processes. 56  
 
In avoiding this ‘compartmentalization’ of Southeast Asia within the broader Western-
centric focus of International Relations, this thesis suggests that there is the need for 
profound understandings of local knowledge and global doctrine, that is, of the 
interrelationship between domestic social forces and global processes within individual 
countries like Malaysia.  This matter is deeply related to the culture of Southeast Asia, a 
region whose principle characteristic, it has been argued, has been to absorb foreign 
influences in such a way as to develop rather than obliterate its own genius.57  
Historically, the peoples of Southeast Asia have displayed the ability to embrace the 
best of that which is foreign without destroying that which is authentically local and, as 
such, the region as a whole presents an ideal laboratory in which global processes and 
local knowledge are, and always have been, partners locked in a dizzying embrace.58 
 
More than any other country in the region, though, Malaysia represents the ideal focus 
for in-depth empirical research vis-à-vis the postcolonial ‘nation-building’ project and 
how this exercise plays out in the local/global context. On the one hand, the unique mix 
of communities of Malays, Chinese, Indians and other indigenous peoples were thought 
by some to have been impossible ingredients for a new nation.  At the very least, this 
ethno-religious blend was viewed as severe challenge to any idea of nation-building.  
More positively, Malaysia could be viewed as a microcosm of continental Asia’s 
encounter with the Western world, and could further be seen as an uneasy co-habitation 
                                                
55 Clifford Geertz (1973). “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture.” in Clifford 
Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books; p.26 & p.28. 
56 D. Yanow, P. Schwartz-Shea and M.J. Freitas (2008). “Case Study Research in Political Science.” In, 
A.J. Mills, G. Durepos and E. Wiebe, (eds.), Encyclopedia of Case Study Research. London:Sage; p.3 and 
David Dessler (2006). “Case Studies and the Philosophy of Science.” Qualitative Methods: Newsletter of 
the American Political Science Association Organized Section on Qualitative Methods, 4(1), pp.43-45. 
57 Harding, p.41. 
58 Harding, p.47. 
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of several cultures whose merchant classes had known one another for several 
centuries.59 Malaysia, with its peoples of very different races and cultures, including 
many of recent immigrant origins, offers a striking example of the complications that a 
yet-to-be nation has to face, both in terms of its domestic ethno-religious composition as 
well as in its international relations.   
 
We can learn more from the Malaysian example than from other Southeast Asian 
countries in order to rethink some of the common assumptions about nationalism, nation 
and globalization.  An important characteristic of Malaysian history has been the 
peninsula’s long history of openness to the movement of people, ideas and trade.  
Furthermore, conceptions of the Malaysian nation-state were modified right from the 
start, with nationhood operating on “a precarious notion of cultural differentiation but 
with equal opportunity and treatment for all members of a national society.”60  Since its 
very beginnings, then, the Malaysian construction and definitions of nation and 
nationality have never been based directly on European ideals.  As such, Malaysia 
presents itself as an ideal means of illuminating just how the formation and 
transformation of social and political orders is always necessarily informed by people’s 
shared histories and emotive allegiances.  As Goh Beng Lan has noted the “modified 
and perhaps awkward [Malaysian] nation-state model suffers serious tensions and 
contradictions – the most important of which are the issues of state hegemony and equal 
rights to economic and social opportunities between a cultural [Malay] core and other 
ethnic groups.”61  
 
Since independence state actors in Malaysia have found it necessary to engage with the 
global in order to meet their development aspirations as well as with respect to 
normative issues, such as international recognition.  Considering the postcolonial, 
multiethnic/multi-religious nature of Malaysia, state actors there have also found it 
necessary to create a sense of national identity and loyalty where perhaps one had never 
previously existed.  As argued above, ethnic and/or religious issues arguably play a 
more significant role in such countries than they do in developed countries and, as such, 
issues of legitimacy/legitimation are perhaps more acute and subject to more apparent 
contestation in a country like Malaysia.  What Figure 1 above aims to capture then is 
                                                
59 Wang, p.xvi. 
60 Goh Beng Lan, p.7. 
61 Goh Beng Lan, p.8. 
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how the mutually constitutive dynamic between domestic society, the state and the 
global informs issues of political legitimacy and legitimation. To reiterate once more, 
this thesis argues that their operation, along with the interrelationship between domestic 
social forces, the state and global processes is most evident in the (re)construction and 
use of national identity discourses.   
 
Significance of Research 
 
This thesis seeks to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the interrelationship 
between the domestic and the global in International Relations, particularly with respect 
to the under-analyzed area of postcolonial, multiethnic/multi-religious, developing 
states.  It builds on the works of a number of scholars who have investigated the 
interplay between global processes and the state as well as those who have analyzed 
state-society relations.  Located within each of these two broad fields are discussions on 
the nature and practice of legitimacy/legitimation.  This research departs from the 
mainstream theories on these issues in a number of ways.  First, by focusing on the 
triangular interrelationship between domestic social forces, the state and global 
processes.  In particular, it expands upon existing literature by drawing these three as 
part of a mutually constitutive dynamic.  Second, by considering dominant as well as 
rival, subjugated conceptions and practices of legitimacy and national identity, this 
research provides a much fuller picture of how these concepts are articulated in 
Malaysia.  
 
The findings of this research have important theoretical and policy implications.  At the 
theoretical level, they suggest that, in practice, any divide that exists between analyses 
of state-society relations on the one hand and state-global processes on the other, is 
largely redundant.  But while they may be conceived of as two sides of the same coin, 
the exact nature of the mutually constitutive dynamic between domestic society, the 
state and the global may be an asymmetrical one.  What is required, therefore, is a 
means of exploring the shape of any such asymmetry and a central finding of this thesis 
is that a historical consideration of discourses on national identity (‘nations-of-intent’) 
provides one such way of doing so.  From a policy perspective, the findings suggest that 
political leaders in multiethnic/multi-religious states need to strengthen their role in 
formulating more inclusive conceptions of national identity if they are going to find an 
acceptable balance between particularistic ethnic/religious desires and the universal 
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desire for economic development and ‘national’ stability in a world that is becoming 
increasingly globalized. 
 
Thesis Overview 
 
This thesis is organized around the central theme of national identity and the 
interrelationship between domestic social forces, the state and global forces.  Chapter 
one forms the theoretical backbone of this study and is arranged in seven sections.  The 
first three sections of this chapter deal with the central elements of Figure 1: the state 
and its interrelationships with the global and domestic society, respectively.  A distinct 
focus on the concepts of legitimacy and legitimation informs this discussion and, 
together with the subject of the fourth section – sovereignty bargains – are then further 
developed as a means of exploring the complexion of the mutually constitutive dynamic 
that forms the conceptual focus of this thesis.  The final three sections then outline why 
and how an emphasis on discursive (re)conceptualizations of national identity over time 
are a valuable means of analyzing the shape of a country’s society-state-global 
interrelationship. 
 
The chapters that follow comprise the historical case study with empirical investigations 
based on a range of sources, including primary materials and semi-structured interviews 
with Malaysian politicians, academics, journalists, activists, lawyers, artists, social 
commentators and business people.62  Each empirical chapter explores and analyzes the 
historical evolution of the society-state-global interrelationship in Malaysia using 
(re)conceptions of national identity as the organizing principle.  Chapter two provides a 
brief historical sketch of the pre-colonial and colonial history of Malaya, providing a 
contextual background for the chapters that then follow.  Chapter three covers the 
period immediately following Independence as the newly independent Malaya/Malaysia 
sought to negotiate a range of internal and external pressures in order to develop its own 
individual personality.  In this chapter I argue that it was the inability of state actors to 
adequately manage the society-state interrelationship within the broader society-state-
global dynamic that resulted in the eventual collapse of the system of legitimation most 
clearly represented in the bloody ethnic riots of May 1969.  Chapter four explores the 
                                                
62 Forty individuals were interviewed over two separate fieldwork trips in 2009 and 2010.  Each interview 
was conducted in accordance with the provisions outlined in Human Ethics Protocol 2008/459 granted by 
the Office of Research Integrity at the Australian National University.  If a full list of my interview 
subjects is required, please contact me directly via email (michael.oshannassy@anu.edu.au). 
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evolution of this dynamic and the changing nature of national identity discourses in 
Malaysia between 1969-1980, highlighting how state actors failed to develop a broadly 
acceptable collective identity in the wake of the 1969 ethnic riots.  It is during this time 
period that we see state actors in Malaysia began in earnest to explicitly link 
conceptualizations of political legitimacy to economic performance which, considering 
Malaysia’s traditionally open economy, meant that they now increasingly were forced to 
negotiate between a range internal and external forces in order to legitimate their 
authority.  Chapter five surveys the ways in which the interrelationship between society, 
state and the global evolved between 1981-1996.  Specifically, it investigates how the 
Malaysian state under Prime Minister Mahathir attempted to more closely manage the 
terms of its internal and external relations according to the logic of its authority-defined 
‘nation-of-intent’ in the face of domestic and international challenges to its political 
authority which encouraged alternative conceptualizations of the ‘national’. The final 
empirical chapter, which covers the time period 1997-2011, outlines how a range of 
economic, social and political forces, both external and internal in nature, compelled 
state actors in Malaysia to be more flexible in their articulation of an authority-defined 
‘nation-of-intent’.63  In particular, Malaysia’s national model and authority-defined 
‘nation-of-intent’ have been largely shaped by the government’s negotiations with the 
broad Reformasi (Reform) movement that emerged in the wake of the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997-1998.  Furthermore, this chapter argues that meaningful socio-economic 
and political liberalization is now required if state actors wish to fulfill long-standing 
development objectives and legitimate their political authority vis-à-vis a broad cross-
section of Malaysian society.  The conclusion to this thesis summarizes the major 
research findings, discusses the theoretical and policy implications, and more broadly 
assesses the future prospects for change and transformation in postcolonial, 
multiethnic/multi-religious states like Malaysia. 
 
                                                
63 I recognize that my choice of 2011 as the end point for this thesis may be somewhat arbitrary 
considering the fact that this introduction is being written in 2012.  However, this is not a thesis that is 
focused primarily on contemporary Malaysia but, rather, one that explores a longer historical trajectory in 
order to chart how the interplay between the domestic and the international has affected 
conceptualizations of national identity and political legitimacy in Malaysia.  Besides, at the end of the 
day, one simply must make a choice of when to stop writing. 
